


NOTES FROM OUR ATTIC

A CURATOR'S POCKET HISTORY OF THE CIA



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NOTES FROM OUR ATTIC:
A CURATOR'S POCKET
HISTORY OF THE CIA

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC

The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger's desire to create within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems." The Center, comprising both professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past activities, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges.

To support these efforts, CSI publishes books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession, to include this publication. It also administers the CIA Museum.

Comments and questions may be addressed to:
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

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Preface

HISTORY CAN BE STUDIED IN MORE THAN ONE WAY. You can learn about facts and ideas from books. You can search for the documents that the books are based on. You can take the material approach: go to the places where history was made, perhaps join a group of re-enactors, and absorb the atmosphere. Or you can go to a museum. Museums are where you discover history by studying things, that is, artifacts, in context. What we do here is tell the story of the Central Intelligence Agency through a selection of the artifacts collected by the CIA Museum, often called “The Best Museum You’ve Never Seen” because we display our artifacts in their true CIA context—but only staff and official visitors to the CIA Headquarters compound can see them. This is part of an initiative to share our treasures with a wider audience. Because we are interpreting history through artifacts, our catalog is a little different from other forms of history that start with a narrative and may or may not use photographs and maps to illustrate a story. We start with what we have in the collection and use artifacts to reconstruct the history of the Agency. The result is more impressionistic and less linear than other histories, but we hope it will be just as memorable and informative.



Foreword

“The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged.”

— GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1777

SINCE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, various groups in the US Government have collected and disseminated intelligence. Beginning in the 1880s, military and naval attachés at American embassies overseas were often spies in uniform, collecting information about the host country. In the 1920s, the State Department and the Army ran a successful “Cipher Bureau,” but Secretary of State Henry Stimson shut it down, famously declaring that it was wrong for “gentlemen” to “read each other’s mail.”

In the months before Pearl Harbor, both the Navy and the Army were reading various Japanese coded messages. Their failure to work together was one of the reasons the Japanese achieved surprise and destroyed much of the Pacific fleet in December 1941, thereby thrusting the United States into World War II. Pearl Harbor became the iconic intelligence failure of the 20th century and one of the driving forces for more and better strategic intelligence. The wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) grew out of this failure, and the post-war CIA grew out of OSS. Allen Dulles, who served both as an OSS station chief and later as CIA Director in the 1950s, captured an important change in the atmosphere in Washington by declaring, “When the fate of a nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read each other’s mail.”



1

OSS: America's First Centralized Intelligence Agency

"[A] novel attempt in American history to organize research, intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations as a unified and essential feature of modern warfare."

— THOMAS TROY DESCRIBING THE OSS

General Donovan always preferred working in the field as opposed to behind a desk. As OSS Director he traveled the world to meet with his officers and gain perspective from being on the front lines. Here he holds an impromptu conference in Southeast Asia.

“Wild Bill” Donovan

In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt brought William J. Donovan, the World War I hero and powerful New York lawyer, into the Executive Branch as the Coordinator of Information, a first step toward the creation of a national intelligence agency.

On 13 June 1942, some six months after the United States entered the war, Roosevelt turned the Office of the Coordinator of Information into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), subordinating it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wartime imperatives meant that Donovan’s limitless imagination, drive, and willingness to take risks were now unleashed, and he proceeded to build an intelligence service by energetic fits and starts. OSS grew quickly, taking on responsibilities for espionage and unconventional warfare in addition to research and analysis. No holds were barred; few Americans worried that there might be any gentlemen on the other side. The war already looked like it would be a bitter fight to the finish.

DONOVAN’S MEDAL OF HONOR, DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS, NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL, AND DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

In the course of his service in World Wars I and II, General Donovan became the only person in American history to receive all four of these honors. When the Medal of Honor was draped around his neck in 1923, Donovan remembered the sacrifice of the men in his regiment by quietly saying, “It doesn’t belong to me. It belongs to the boys who are not here...also to the boys who were lucky enough to come through.”







The Glorious Amateurs

You would expect an agency... [like] the Office of Strategic Services to attract many unorthodox and rugged individuals—and you would be absolutely right. I never distinguished a common denominator... [for] OSS personnel. Love of high adventure would...approach it, yet, on the other hand, many a timid man or woman, motivated by deep patriotism or...hatred of the enemy, outperformed the boys of derring-do.

— STANLEY LOVELL

OSS was a more or less independent intelligence agency with a strategic charter and a number of in-house functions. It was to a large extent self-contained. It hired, trained, equipped, and deployed its own personnel. It could both collect and analyze information to produce useful intelligence. It conducted paramilitary, espionage, and counterespionage operations that often complemented each other. It even had a research and development branch that produced novel spy equipment. The organization's logistics, security, medical, finance, and training offices provided the necessary support.

Many of the original members of OSS were Director Donovan's friends and colleagues. Among them were well-to-do New York lawyers and socialites—hence the joke that OSS really stood for "Oh So Social."

But OSS was far more than a group of gentlemen spies. Along with a few misfits, OSS attracted talented and adventuresome souls from many walks of life. Two-thirds of OSS members came out of the military, many of them daredevils who volunteered for risky missions that no one explained to them until they had signed up—and sometimes not even then. The rest of the workforce was civilian and, especially in the Research & Analysis Branch, included some of the best minds in America.

While not a champion of diversity for its own sake, Donovan was ahead of his time in offering opportunities to anyone with the right qualifications. Some 4,500 OSS employees were women. At least one prominent OSS analyst, Ralph Bunche, was African American.



ADOLF HITLER


Dear Dennis,

OBERSALZBERG, GERMANY V-E day

The man who might have written on this card once controlled Europe — three short years ago when you were born. Today he is dead, his memory despised, his country in ruins. He had a thirst for power, a low opinion of man as an individual, and a fear of intellectual honesty. He was a force for evil in the world. His passing, his defeat — a boon to mankind. But thousands died that it might be so. The price is always high. Love, Daddy

A PERSONAL NOTE FROM RICHARD HELMS

As Americans celebrated victory in Europe on 7 May 1945, OSS officer and future CIA Director Richard Helms wrote this eloquent note to his young son on a sheet of Adolf Hitler's personal stationery. Helms's words captured the meaning of the war, not only for OSS but also for America and most of its allies.



SECRET

PREFACE

This study is not propagandistic in any sense of the term. It represents an attempt to screen the wealth of contradictory, conflicting and unreliable material concerning Hitler into strata which will be helpful to the policy-makers and those who wish to frame a counter-propaganda. For this reason the first three parts are purely descriptive and deal with the man (1) as he appears to himself, (2) as he has been pictured to the German people, and (3) as he is known to his associates. These sections contain the basic material for the psychological analyses in sections IV and V in which an attempt is made to understand Hitler as a person and the motivations underlying his actions.

The material available for such an analysis is extremely scant and spotty. Fortunately, we have had at our disposal a number of informants who knew Hitler well and who have been willing to cooperate to the best of their abilities. The study would have been entirely impossible were it not for the fact that there is a relatively high degree of agreement in the descriptions of Hitler's behavior, sentiments and attitudes given by these several informants. With this as a basis it seemed worthwhile to proceed with the study filling in the lacunae with knowledge gained from clinical experience in dealing with individuals of a similar type. This is not an entirely satisfactory procedure, from a scientific point of view, but it is the only feasible method at the present time. Throughout the study we have tried to be as objective as possible in evaluating his strengths as well as his weaknesses.

All plain numbers in parentheses refer to the page of The Hitler Source-Book, a companion volume in which the original material is to be found together with the complete reference. Numbers in parentheses preceded by M. K. or M. N. O. refer to pages in *Mein Kampf* and *My New Order*, respectively. A detailed Index to the original material is to be found at the beginning of the Source-Book. A complete Bibliography is appended to this study.

It is hoped that the study may be helpful in gaining a deeper insight into Adolf Hitler and the German people and that it may serve as a guide for our propaganda activities as well as our future dealings with them.

Walter C. Langer
CONSULTANT, M. O. BRAUN, OSS

A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ADOLPH HITLER BY WALTER C. LANGER*

William Langer headed OSS Research & Analysis. His younger brother, the psychoanalyst Walter, was a consultant to OSS. Walter achieved a measure of fame in 1943 for his classified 249-page analysis of Hitler's character. The book addressed how the dictator viewed himself and how the German public and his own close associates saw him; it also featured a reconstruction of Hitler's life to explain his behavior during World War II. In the book's conclusion, Langer accurately predicted that the dictator would commit suicide just before the German surrender.

*Langer used an English spelling of Hitler's first name instead of the German spelling "Adolf."

ENIGMA

The Allies enjoyed great success in the realm of signals intelligence, arguably much more than in other kinds of intelligence operations. The German armed forces used Enigma cipher machines to create what they thought were unbreakable messages. The Enigma could offer 150,000,000,000,000,000 possible solutions to an enciphered message. Yet Allied code breakers were often able to find the right solution and read German secrets, some of which found their way to OSS's counterintelligence staff. The intercepts are said to have shortened the war by two years.





FUTSCHES REICH



COUNTERFEIT NAZI STAMPS

Within OSS, Morale Operations was responsible for the design and printing of counterfeit postage stamps that featured a skeletal version of Hitler's face. The idea was to put them on letters and insert the letters into the German postal system.





OSS ID BADGE

This small badge for overt employees identified Technical Sergeant Spiros H. Kaleyias of Special Operations while he worked at OSS facilities like the E Street Compound in Washington.

MARK IV RADIO

In 1942, René Joyeuse escaped from France and joined the Free French Forces, eventually serving with OSS. Sent to London for training, he parachuted back into France in 1944 before D-Day and used this radio to transmit intelligence as part of Operation Sussex. He received the French Legion of Honor and the American Distinguished Service Cross for his service.



BLOOD CHIT

OSS issued this silk blood chit for use in the China-Burma-India Theater in case the bearer became lost in unfamiliar territory. It reads "This foreign person (American) has come to China to help the war effort. Soldiers and civilians, one and all, should save and protect him."

HI-STANDARD .22-CALIBER PISTOL

This short-range, automatic pistol was ideal for use in close spaces or for eliminating sentries. Its silencer suppressed all the flash and 90 percent of the sound when discharged.



FREE THAI PATCH

OSS provided critical support to the Free Thai movement, essentially a patriotic resistance led by a cadre of anti-Japanese Thai officials in key government positions. By early 1945, OSS had even managed to set up a covert base in Japanese-occupied Bangkok. The bonds and contacts formed between these Americans and the Free Thai would reap significant benefits for the United States during the Vietnam war more than two decades later.





THE FAIRBAIRN-SYKES FIGHTING KNIFE

Developed in 1940, this specialized fighting knife was standard issue for many OSS officers and their British counterparts. Capt. William H. Pietsch, Jr., carried this one when he parachuted into Nazi-occupied France on his first mission as a member of an OSS Jedburgh team.



2

From OSS to CIA

“[After the war,] this agency...should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on...espionage, counter-espionage, and...special operations...to anticipate and counter...enemy action.”

— WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

DCI Walter Bedell Smith (left) and President Harry S. Truman look over a globe on Smith's first day in office. Over the course of his tenure, Smith oversaw a broad re-organization of the Agency, much of which is still in place today.

At War's End

OSS did not win World War II for the Allies but did make important contributions to the war effort. Donovan argued that OSS, or something like it, should survive the war. He foresaw a centralized organization that would report directly to the President. Donovan's many bureaucratic enemies objected to his proposals, arguing that the OSS was a wartime expedient that should be dissolved at the end of the war. The issue was still unresolved when President Roosevelt died in April 1945.

Donovan tried his best to garner the support of the new President, Harry S. Truman, but Donovan's rivals gained and held the upper ground. In the end, Truman signed an executive order for the "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions" along with a lukewarm personal letter to Donovan thanking him for his "capable leadership."

At this point, Donovan had to focus on dissolving his organization in the space of less than two weeks and preserving the record of its accomplishments.



STELLA UZDAWINIS'S PENDANT

Upon the dissolution of the OSS on 1 October 1945, Donovan arranged for members of the organization to buy a commemorative pin or pendant for a dollar. Stella Uzdawinis, a civilian assigned to the Research & Analysis and Secret Intelligence (SI) Branches, purchased this pendant. While assigned to SI, Uzdawinis worked in France as a communicator.

CIA SEAL AUTOGRAPHED BY PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

The US Army Institute of Heraldry, which supports both the military and other branches of the Federal Government, designed the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950. President Truman signed several prints of the new seal, some of which are in the Museum's collection.



New Requirements

Donovan was not long gone from Washington before the need for some sort of centralized intelligence agency reasserted itself. As the US digested the lessons of World War II, the Cold War with the Soviet Union intensified. The Soviets were threatening American interests worldwide, especially in fragile Western European countries still recovering from the war. Clearly, the US Government needed to strengthen its intelligence function and generally streamline the relationships between the Army and Navy. The result was the National Security Act of 1947, which created the US Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, not least, the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of the plans that Donovan had advocated found their way into CIA's enabling act.

A New Agency

Like OSS, the new Central Intelligence Agency housed a number of functions; it too would become a one-stop intelligence shop. CIA took over an organization that had grown out of the OSS, the Office of Special Operations, which was mainly responsible for running spies. In 1948, the National Security Council created the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) to conduct paramilitary and psychological warfare, two more OSS functions. OPC first operated under joint CIA-State Department supervision before becoming an integral part of CIA in 1950. Rounding out the picture were analysts such as those in the Office of Reports and Estimates, originally charged with briefing the President. To do all of this work, CIA hired a number of OSS veterans, three of whom would eventually become Directors of Central Intelligence and all of whom would leave their imprint on the new agency.

EDITOR'S COPY OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES FOR THE PRESIDENT

Annoyed by the amount of uncoordinated and contradictory intelligence reports he was seeing in the wake of World War II, President Truman tasked CIA and its immediate predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), to provide him with a synthesized daily briefing on the latest foreign intelligence. The "Daily Summary," a two- to three-page publication written for Truman and his designees, debuted on 15 February 1946 and established a tradition. Daily briefings have continued during the terms of every president since Truman.

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
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671 C.R.
In addition to moving this force, he is supporting Chinese Theatre reports
that Chinese troops are being moved north by
the Chinese Government. The Chinese
Foreign Office has informed Embassy Chungking that negotiations with
France concerning Indochina are in the final stage. Principal provisions
of the proposed agreement include: (a) withdrawal of Chinese troops, (b) holding of prewar Chinese rights, (c) freedom of transportation, (d) elimination of
Indochina. ~~Editorial 9/9/49~~ ~~Editorial 9/9/49~~

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EUROPE-AFRICA

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EUROPE-ASIA

space of relief for displaced persons in its Zone. The
authorized on 15th May to announce by 1st March to
of 1 July for all displaced persons in the US Zone to
will be made, however, for those persons on the grounds of
1 because of possible persecution on the grounds of
desiring repatriation will be moved out by 1 July.
wait for solution of Turkish "problem" -- in con-
cerning Foreign Minister, as reported by Embassy
Tugendhat has stated that "we waited a long
as we wanted with Poland and finally got it; we
said that for a reestablishment of friendly
a solution of the USSR's claims regard-
ing and important, but the question of the
the Soviet requirements regarding
the USSR to must have an adequate
Union will not be endangered,
that Soviet use of bases in the Straits
in Venezuela Giulio. Military authorities
press attacks on the Allied Military
effort to obtain UNO examination
authorities also report reinforcements
zone of the province, apparently
lation during the visit of the
Theatre reports that five
moved north by him for
res, he is supplying



2430 E ST. N.W.



CORNERSTONE TROWEL

President Dwight D. Eisenhower joined Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to lay the cornerstone for the Original Headquarters Building of CIA on 3 November 1959. Just over 12 years old at the time, CIA was now one step closer to having a permanent headquarters facility. Agency employees began occupying the Langley facility in 1962.

EARLY CIA SIGN

After accommodating OSS Headquarters from 1942 to 1945, the compound at 2430 E Street, NW, in Washington, DC, was CIA's headquarters from 1947 to 1961. Legend has it that the only signage at that site read "Government Printing Office" until one of President Eisenhower's staff members could not find the place. The annoyed President is said to have ordered CIA to put up an accurate sign. The Agency complied immediately, producing this sign, which remained at the entry gate until the front fence was demolished to make room for the present-day E Street Expressway.



3

Formative Years and Early Successes

“To discover the exact dimensions of communist activity in all countries of the world and to counter and negate communist political gains were [the] two main tasks entrusted to...CIA.”

— RAY CLINE

Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer, had grown disaffected with the Soviet regime and spied for CIA and British intelligence from 1960 until his arrest in 1962. One of the most productive assets in Agency history, he provided extensive documentary material on Soviet missile capabilities that would ultimately help President Kennedy defuse the Cuban Missile Crisis.

High Altitude Success

C'est formidable! — FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE, WHEN TOLD
U-2 PICTURES WERE TAKEN AT AN ALTITUDE OF 14 MILES

Especially after the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, understanding the capabilities of the USSR, the main enemy of the United States, became vitally important to the US Government. This was no easy task, as the USSR was a closed society dominated by the Soviet state security service that had many names but is remembered as the KGB. The US Government came to realize that overhead photoreconnaissance could fill the intelligence gap, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved ambitious programs for CIA to develop three technological marvels: the high-flying U-2 aircraft, the supersonic A-12 aircraft, and the Corona satellites. The resulting intelligence products, starting with photographs taken by the U-2, made an enormous difference to the US, enabling it to progress from sophisticated guesswork about Soviet capabilities to evidence-based analysis. That the U-2 program against the USSR ended when the Soviets were finally able to bring down a CIA aircraft in May 1960 should not detract from the many contributions the program made between 1956 and 1960, in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in other parts of the world through the present day.

THE U-2 MODEL

Although the Soviets tracked each U-2 overflight on radar, they lacked the technology to shoot one down—until 1 May 1960. On that day, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers flew the final USSR mission, which ended when a Soviet missile downed his plane near Sverdlovsk. Powers survived, and the Soviets held a show trial, convicting him of spying. Eventually freed in exchange for a Soviet spy in prison in the United States, Powers used this CIA-produced model when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1962. Several portions of the model were detachable so Powers could demonstrate how his plane broke apart after the missile exploded near the rear of the aircraft.





U-2 PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT AND HELMET

CIA developed the U-2 to fly at altitudes well above 63,000 feet, where human blood starts to bubble without artificial air pressure. U-2 pilots wore a special helmet and form-fitting, insulated pressure suit to protect them from depressurization and low temperatures during flight. If the suit looks something like an old-fashioned girdle, there is a reason for that: CIA contracted with the David Clark Corset and Brassiere Manufacturer for its construction.





Espionage

While overhead photoreconnaissance was able to fill many intelligence gaps, a photograph can tell you only so much, and CIA never stopped looking for ground truth in other ways. CIA conducted unconventional paramilitary operations, arranging for brave men and women to parachute into communist territory in much the same way that the Jedburgh teams had jumped into occupied France in 1944. Only a few of these missions yielded useful information; most of them ended in failure. At the same time, CIA continued to conduct traditional espionage operations against the Soviet Union, trying to spot, develop, and recruit Soviet officials with access to significant information and who were willing to spy for the free world. The work was difficult and frustrating. Perfectly competent and diligent CIA officers could spend a career working against a Soviet target, doing everything right, and still have little to show for their efforts; recruiting a Soviet was never easy. Then, from time to time, a remarkable opportunity would present itself—more than once in the form of a walk-in or write-in—and CIA would reap the benefits.

KISEVALTER CUFFLINKS

Case Officer George Kisevalter was a CIA Trailblazer who helped perfect the art of running secret operations. In 1953, he was assigned to handle Pyotr Popov, the first GRU (Soviet military intelligence) officer to spy for America. The CIA made two sets of these unusual cufflinks to enable Popov to recognize any CIA officer who approached him. West Point graduate and CIA officer Peer de Silva designed each cufflink to resemble his alma mater's "Duty, Honor, Country" crest with the Pallas Athena helmet over a Greek sword. When Kisevalter retired, DCI Richard Helms presented this pair to him.

Warfare by Other Means

The US Government had to learn how to conduct secret operations in the Cold War. Few precedents existed. The primary mission was relatively straightforward: predict if/how/when the Cold War could become a hot war—to prevent another Pearl Harbor. Paramilitary initiatives also followed from World War II experience. But what about political warfare, that is, influencing political outcomes without showing the hand of the US Government? The threat was relatively easy to grasp, but the possible American responses took some time to develop. As the eminent diplomat George Kennan put it, “We were alarmed at the inroads of... Russian influence in Western Europe...particularly over the situation in France and Italy. We felt that the communists were using...very extensive funds...to gain control of key elements of [political] life in France and Italy, particularly the... press, the labor unions, [and] student organizations.” To counter the threat, in 1948 the Truman Administration decided to use the CIA to provide secret campaign funds to Italy’s pro-western Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats won the election, averting a possible communist takeover and establishing a precedent. The CIA proceeded with operations in Iran—in concert with the British—and in Guatemala to install pro-Western governments.

DOCTOR ZHIVAGO IN RUSSIAN

Renowned Russian author Boris Pasternak won the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature for his “lyrical poetry and...epic” writing, particularly in his masterpiece *Doctor Zhivago*, a love story set against the backdrop of the Russian Revolution. Soviet authorities suppressed the book as “a malicious libel of the USSR.” In 2008, a broadcaster and literary historian named Ivan Tolstoy, himself the scion of a famous Russian literary family, published a book alleging that the CIA had secretly arranged for the publication of a limited-run, Russian-language edition of *Doctor Zhivago*. According to *The Washington Post*, Tolstoy concluded that “Pasternak’s novel became a tool that was used by the United States to teach the Soviet Union a lesson.” He argued that it was part of an ongoing US campaign to promote authors who told the truth about the harsh realities of life in the Soviet Union. CIA declassified its activities related to *Doctor Zhivago* in 2014.

БОРИС ЛЕОНИДОВИЧ ПАСТЕРНАК

Доктор
Живаго

РОМАН

Société d'édition et
d'impression Mondiale

1959

We Didn't Walk There

Most forms of covert action cannot occur without a hidden infrastructure for support. Someone must hire and train the people, procure the equipment, rent the property, and get the people and equipment where they need to be. In its first few decades, CIA relied on proprietary companies to do much of the work. Among them was an airline, known first as Civil Air Transport (CAT), which flew commercial routes throughout Asia. CAT seemed like just another airline to the average passenger who did not need to know that a CAT subsidiary provided airplanes and crews for secret CIA missions. The Agency eventually gave CAT a new name, Air America, under which it flew into history as one of the mainstays of CIA's covert war in Laos. As one of the largest paramilitary operations ever undertaken by the Agency, this covert effort is credited with blocking communist initiatives in Laos for some 13 years. Anyone on one of Air America's hair-raising operational flights in Laos appreciated the fact that they were not flying on an ordinary airline.





AIR AMERICA IRONWORK

This ironwork was once part of the gate at an Air America facility within the Royal Thai Air Force base at Udorn, Thailand. Udorn was a critical center for training Air America crew and home for a flight operations department that provided ground support to more than 70 Air America aircraft.

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT CARRY-ON BAG

This black vinyl bag was one of many different types of CAT premiums given to passengers on the airline.



4

The Not-So-Cold War

“Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photointerpreter can be sure of anything.”

— ARTHUR LUNDAHL, DIRECTOR OF CIA’S NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, ABOUT SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA

Overhead reconnaissance photo from a U-2 flown by the Strategic Air Command on 14 October 1962 proved that offensive surface-to-surface missiles, capable of striking the United States, were being installed in Cuba, triggering the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis.

Bay of Pigs

On 17 April 1961, some 1,500 "Brigade 2056" Cuban fighters, trained and equipped by CIA, waded ashore at a place in Cuba called the Bay of Pigs. It was an ill-fated attempt at regime change. For reasons that are still debated, the operation was a catastrophic failure for CIA and the United States, to say nothing of the members of the brigade. The consequences on both sides were far reaching. For Fidel Castro, the operation had the ultimate effect of cementing his hold on power. His ragtag army had marched into Havana two years earlier, and he was only too happy to use the opportunity to dispose of counter-revolutionary threats. For the months-old Kennedy Administration, it was a major foreign policy embarrassment that helped to set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis 18 months later. For the CIA, it was an historical turning point. Until April 1961, the Agency had enjoyed a fair degree of success in its covert-action initiatives. After the Bay of Pigs, the long-serving DCI, Allen Dulles, and his operations director, Richard Bissell, both lost their jobs, and the Agency was on track to become the object of often-hostile scrutiny that peaked during the directorship of William E. Colby in the mid-1970s. Colby later remembered the Bay of the Pigs as "the start of the CIA's slide from being one of the most prestigious and admired agencies of the government toward one of its most denounced and condemned."

COMMEMORATIVE EMBLEMS

Patches and insignia designed for Brigade 2506 in the Bay of Pigs invasion.



The Cuban Missile Crisis

The most straightforward way in which the Cuban Missile Crisis was a sequel to the Bay of Pigs was that it gave the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, an excuse to bolster the island's defenses against the United States. In the summer of 1962, CIA noted an upsurge of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. The issue that soon presented itself was: just what did those shipments include—nuclear missiles capable of striking US cities? CIA's job was to answer that question. Initially, CIA's answer was in the negative but changed in relatively short order to reflect the true picture. In the end, CIA provided information, analysis, and estimates from human sources as well as aerial reconnaissance showing just what the Soviets were up to. The world now stood closer to the brink of nuclear war than it had at any other time in the Cold War. CIA intelligence enabled the President to take a step back from the brink.

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW

Following tense negotiations with the United States, the Soviets eventually agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba and sent confirmation of that agreement to the White House via diplomatic channels. Sensing the urgency of this message and knowing the possible delay in diplomatic communications, the Soviets also broadcast the same message in Russian over Radio Moscow, hoping that someone in the US would hear it and relay it to President Kennedy more quickly. In cooperation with British partners, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (CIA's unclassified print and broadcast media center) monitored the radio transmission, translated the message, and flashed it to the White House before the official diplomatic version arrived.

FRTS 47

KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION L
MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN AT 1404 ZHT ON 27 OCTOBER
BROADCASTS A KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY. HE DECLARER: I REDE MED
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY YOU BEAR FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY.

AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ORDERED THE DISMANTLING OF BASES
HAVANA WAS SHELLED, ALLEGEDLY TO THE USSR. A FEW DAYS AGO,
SHELLED. CUBANS WANT TO BE MASTERS OF THEIR COUNTRY. THE THREAT OF
INVASION HAS UPSET THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

I WISH TO AGAIN STATE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED
THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INVADE CUBA. HENCE WE HAVE ORDERED
OUR OFFICERS TO STOP BUILDING BASES, DISMANTLE THE EQUIPMENT,
AND SEND IT BACK HOME. THIS CAN BE DONE UNDER U.N. SUPERVISION.

WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE, (CUT)
CONFIDENTIALITY OF TENSION, AND WE MUST SEE TO IT THAT NO OTHER
COUNTRY IN THE UNION MIGHT LEAD TO A WORLD NUCLEAR WAR.

(MORE)

22 OCT 1962 F7W

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


January 9, 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman:


I wish to express to you, the members of the United States Intelligence Board, and to the individual members of the intelligence agencies my deep and sincere appreciation for your outstanding service to our Nation -- and the Free World -- during the recent international crisis.

In the course of the past few months I have had occasion to again observe the extraordinary accomplishments of our intelligence community, and I have been singularly impressed with the overall professional excellence, selfless devotion to duty, resourcefulness and initiative manifested in the work of this group. The fact that we had timely and accurate information, skillfully analyzed and clearly presented, to guide us in our judgments during this crisis is, I believe, the greatest tribute to the effectiveness of these individuals and agencies. The magnitude of their contribution can be measured, in part, by the fact that the peace was sustained during a most critical time.

It is, of course, a great source of strength to me to know that we have such dedicated and skilled men and women in the service of our Nation in these times of peril. Although I cannot personally commend each member of the intelligence community for their individual efforts, I would like you to convey to them, through the members of the United States Intelligence Board, my personal word of commendation, my deep admiration for their achievements, and the appreciation of a grateful Nation.



The Honorable John A. McCone
Chairman, United States Intelligence Board



DOCUMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

President Kennedy signed this letter of commendation to DCI John McCone after the crisis was over. It went far beyond the conventional bureaucratic thank-you note. It was a well-deserved tribute not only to McCone, who was one of the first in Washington to understand Soviet intentions, but also to the men and women of the CIA and the Intelligence Community who worked to provide the President with intelligence as he faced this Soviet threat.

PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

In the summer of 1961, not far removed from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence reformatted the daily briefing material for the President to better suit John F. Kennedy's reading preferences and renamed the briefing as the President's Intelligence Checklist (PICL). CIA produced a commemorative issue of the PICL following Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963. The lone content inside was a poetic verse Kennedy had used to reassure the public during the tense days of the Cuban Missile Crisis: *Bullfight critics ranked in rows, Crowd the enormous plaza full; But only one is there who knows, And he's the man who fights the bull.*

The 30-Year War in Southeast Asia

[Y]our [CIA] analysts are the only honest guys in town, and we need to know the truth.


— MCGEORGE BUNDY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON

The struggle between communist and non-communist forces in Vietnam lasted some 30 years. From 1944 on, the OSS and later the CIA operated there, and from 1965 to 1973, the US military committed hundreds of thousands of servicemen and servicewomen to the conflict. Vietnam became the signature foreign-policy issue for the Johnson Administration and, not coincidentally, the subject of superheated controversy. Should the United States be involved in the conflict? Should CIA be conducting counterinsurgency paramilitary operations in Vietnam? What were the communists' strengths and intentions? The Intelligence Community, especially CIA, met the resulting demand for information and intelligence about the war. In doing so, CIA leadership found itself plunged into controversy more than once, as it did when CIA and US military estimates of the enemy's strength differed significantly. (In retrospect, the CIA estimates were much higher and more accurate.) In 1975, when the war ended in a communist victory, CIA air assets played an important role in evacuating American and Vietnamese officials from the country.

ELEPHANT COUNTER

During the Vietnam war, the CIA recruited Laotian trail watchers to count enemy troops and supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam to South Vietnam along the border of Laos. As many of the recruits could not read or write, CIA technical wizards developed this unusual counting mechanism. Instead of words, it features pictograms representing troops, weapons, vehicles, and—in some models—elephants, common beasts of burden in Laos. The data could be transmitted to an airplane overhead by activating a toggle switch.





AN-2 "COLT" THROTTLE

On 12 January 1968, four North Vietnamese AN-2 Colt biplanes, painted dark green and modified to drop bombs, flew into Laos headed for a US radar facility that was providing critical all-weather guidance to American warplanes flying strike missions against targets in North Vietnam. By chance, an unarmed CIA UH-1D "Huey" helicopter approached the site at the same time and gave chase, with the on-board flight mechanic firing his AK-47 at one of the Colts. After a 20-minute pursuit, the Colt crashed, thus earning the Huey's two-man crew the distinction of having shot down an enemy fixed-wing aircraft from a helicopter—a one-of-a-kind victory. This throttle was recovered from the wreckage.


INFRARED LANTERN BEACON

Modifications by Agency technicians transformed this commercial Coleman lantern into an infrared beacon that could be seen from as far away as 250 feet. Gasoline-powered and painted dull black, the beacon emitted a narrow vertical infrared beam as well as some visible light, making it useful for marking air-drop and landing-field locations during the Vietnam war.



intended to reflect to staff
what will be required next
in terms of a timely
and "clean" return of
our training. I believe
that every 15 minutes for
each crew documentation
and an additional 30
minutes for further

S A G O N FACILITIES MAP





EVACUATION MAP AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAIGON

By early 1975, the US had prepared for a possible evacuation from Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, then under threat from the North Vietnamese Army. The plan that emerged, FREQUENT WIND, was the last gasp of American involvement in the war. Not widely known was that the CIA was fully integrated into the plan and that Air America played a pivotal role in the evacuation. In April 1975, the CIA designated 14 assembly points in Saigon for the emergency evacuation of key personnel. This map identifies the locations of those points and the accompanying documents give instructions for the evacuation.

HOMEMADE VIET CONG PISTOL

A counterintelligence team in South Vietnam collected this homemade Viet Cong pistol. The primitive weapon was symbolic of the grassroots communist insurgency.

Reform

In most fields of human endeavor, allowances are made for difficulties and obstacles, failure may be counted as a step on the way to success. ... Intelligence cannot count on this kind of sympathy. — WALTER LAQUEUR

The Vietnam war was a watershed in American political history. As the war dragged on, many Americans came to challenge the underlying assumptions of the Cold War, leading to a reassessment of CIA's role. What exactly had the CIA been doing in the name of the American people? Had it gone beyond its original charter by running front organizations at home, spying on anti-war protesters or experimenting with mind-altering drugs? And what should its future role be? The Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, established a policy of full disclosure of any past actions that, in hindsight, might appear to have overstepped the bounds of legality or propriety, thus sharing the Agency's so-called "family jewels" with Congress. The result was a new regime of executive orders and Congressional oversight for the Intelligence Community.

DEAR PISTOL

The CIA DEnied ARea pistol is a 9-mm parabellum, single-shot, reloadable pistol designed for distribution to foreign fighters willing to operate behind enemy lines. The receiver is made of cast aluminum, and the barrel of blue steel. It came with spare cartridges in the grip and a small instruction sheet. Like the OSS Liberator pistol of WWII, the Vietnam-era close-range DEAR pistol could, in theory at least, be used to take a more powerful weapon from an enemy, although existing records suggest few were ever issued or used. Most of these pistols, along with other unconventional weapons, were destroyed following the Pike and Church Congressional Committees' investigations into the Agency. Only a few DEAR pistols—this being one—survived.





5

Threats from New Quarters

“There are no facts about the future.”

— DIA DIRECTOR VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS WILSON, 1999

On 4 November 1979, militant Islamic students seized the US Embassy in Tehran. This was the scene near the embassy shortly after the seizure.


444 Days

Ok, so what? — CIA OFFICER AND AMERICAN HOSTAGE WILLIAM DAUGHERTY, UPON BEING CONFRONTED BY IRANIAN INTERROGATORS WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS AGENCY AFFILIATION

The years between 1945 and 1985 sometimes seemed monochromatic, dominated by the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The palette clearly began to change in 1979 when the threat from a new quarter took shape. In a move that CIA did not predict, Islamic fundamentalists overthrew the Shah of Iran. Seen as a bulwark against Soviet influence, he had been a long-time American ally. Believing that the friend of your enemy is also your enemy, the fundamentalists turned into staunch enemies of the United States. That same year, militants aligned with the emerging fundamentalist regime overran the US Embassy in Tehran and took an original total of 63 Americans hostage; another six embassy personnel escaped and hid with Canadian Embassy officials. CIA successfully exfiltrated the so-called "Canadian Six" in an elaborate covert operation—a story dramatized in the award-winning Hollywood movie *Argo* in 2012. CIA also played a significant role in supporting the US military in an attempt to free the hostages by force in Operation *Eagle Claw*. The operation famously failed after the dramatic collision between a tanker plane and rescue helicopter at a makeshift airstrip deep in the Iranian desert.

ARGO PANOPLY

To exfiltrate the six American diplomats sheltered in the homes of Canadian Embassy officials, CIA Directorate of Science & Technology officers created an elaborate ruse—Studio 6, a fake Hollywood production company, and *Argo*, a fake movie based on an actual science-fiction script. The six were able to leave Iran under the pretense of being Canadian filmmakers scouting for filming locations. Creating materials such as movie posters and press releases helped establish the operation's cover.







INFRARED RUNWAY MARKER USED AT DESERT ONE AIRSTRIP

In Operation EAGLE CLAW, the US military needed to safely land fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft under cover of darkness for refueling at a remote desert site in Iran known as "Desert One." This is one of the concealable landing lights developed by CIA to mark the desert landing strip. It was a modified marine buoy light coated with an infrared-filtering lacquer and controlled by a radio-receiver switch used in audio surveillance. Although the operation ended in disaster after a fiery collision between a plane and helicopter, the markers worked perfectly and became the forerunners of standard runway markers for today's special operations forces.

TAR-224 RADIO

A compact, high-frequency, paramilitary transceiver, the TAR-224 enabled communications with field agents operating behind enemy lines. It saw service in Vietnam as well as during Operation EAGLE CLAW.

Afghanistan

[The CIA was]...conducting in Afghanistan what became one of the most successful covert operations since the Second World War. — CHRISTOPHER ANDREW

During the Cold War, the rugged, deeply traditional Islamic country of Afghanistan sat in a strategic position between two Islamic republics, Iran and Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. Committed to expanding their influence in the region, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to protect a relatively new, pro-Soviet government from overthrow by traditionalists. President Jimmy Carter directed CIA to assist the various Islamic rebel groups, generally known as Mujahideen, with money, weapons, medical supplies, and other equipment. The initial goal was simply to bog the Soviets down, not unlike the way that the US had been bogged down in Vietnam. In 1985, on orders from the Reagan Administration, the goal became more ambitious: help the rebels win. To that end, the US Government stepped up its aid to the Mujahideen, supplying them with Stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships and establishing a network of contacts with rebel commanders. The strategy contributed to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.



STINGER MISSILE LAUNCHER

The Stinger missiles supplied by the United States gave Afghan guerrillas the ability to destroy the dreaded Soviet Mi-24D helicopter gunships. Three of the first four Stingers fired each took down a gunship. The guerrillas were now able to challenge Soviet control of the airspace above the battlefield. Mujahideen morale soared as Soviet losses mounted. By 1989, the Soviet Union had concluded that the fight was not worth the cost and withdrew from the country.



**UN
ABRAZO
PERMANENTE**



AFGHANISTAN ANTI-COMMUNIST POSTER

This poster, proclaiming "The Permanent Embrace," decries the prolonged Soviet invasion. Such Spanish-language posters may have been intended for Central America, where the Soviets were supporting another communist regime in Nicaragua.

SOVIET HELICOPTER PILOT'S HELMET

Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson was a devoted supporter of the Mujahideen. On one of his trips to the troubled region, Wilson received this helmet. It was once worn by a Soviet helicopter gunship pilot and was given to Wilson by one of the first Mujahideen fighters to successfully shoot down that type of aircraft.

Year of the Spy

No intelligence service can be more effective than its counterintelligence component for very long. — RICHARD HELMS

In the US, 1985 became known as the “Year of the Spy” because that was the year when 14 Americans were arrested or convicted of spying against their country. It was also the year when the mid-level CIA officer Aldrich Ames became a Soviet mole and when the FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen resumed his career of espionage on behalf of the Soviets. Both working for the KGB, Ames and Hanssen would not be caught for a number of years, giving them ample time to betray many American secrets, including the identities of Soviets (and Russians after 1991) who were spying for the United States. Most of those identified were subsequently executed. No one has been able to explain the remarkable convergence of espionage in this year; “Year of the Spy” was hardly a distinction that the American Intelligence Community wanted. The lesson learned was the need for better counterintelligence strategies, even after the end of the Cold War.

KW-7 AND KW-26 CRYPTO MACHINES

The United States and other NATO countries used these cryptographic communication machines as recently as the mid-1980s. The KW-26 (the larger unit on the bottom) encrypted and decrypted teletype between large sites in bulk and at fast rates. Widely used with over 14,000 units produced, the KW-26 superseded the crypto machines of World War II by using electronic shift registers instead of mechanical rotors. The KW-7 (the smaller unit on top) provided station-to-station communications and featured solid-state circuitry, a rugged housing, and a sealed lid to prevent electro-magnetic emanations. Convicted spy John A. Walker compromised the KW-7 by selling its key cards to the Soviets from 1967 to 1985.





Central America

One of the last frontiers of the Cold War was Central America, where the Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations fought two proxy wars. Both wars originated in clashes between left-wing insurgents and right-wing regimes, and both soon attracted international attention as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States took sides. In the case of Nicaragua, insurgents seized power in 1979 and eventually established the communist Sandinista regime modeled on Castro's Cuba. The CIA's role in Nicaragua was to support the anti-communist fighters known as the Contras. By 1985, the US Congress had cut off aid to the Contras, and in 1990 the Sandinistas were voted out of office, only to return in 2011. In El Salvador, the insurgents challenged an army and government still dominated by traditional oligarchs. The CIA supported the US Government policy of simultaneously strengthening the Salvadoran armed forces and moderating the influence of extremists. The Salvadoran Government and the rebels eventually negotiated a cease-fire that took effect on 1 January 1992 and evolved into a durable peace agreement.

"ATTITUDE" HAT

An Agency officer wore this simple Guatemalan hat while monitoring the Salvadoran Civil War, marked by heavy fighting between leftist insurgents and government forces supported by the United States. He wore the hat on days when things were not going well, as a kind of bellwether. When he left his position, he literally passed the hat to another Agency officer. As the situation began improving, that officer wore it less and less.

The End of History?

For more than 50 years, the CIA devoted most of its time and energy to spying on the Soviets, writing reports and estimates about them, and fighting them or their surrogates on distant battlefields. Starting in 1989, the cracks in the Soviet façade were growing and the infrastructure was buckling. The Berlin Wall came down late in the year, and the Soviet Union itself came apart in 1991. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously declared that the defining failure of the CIA was that it did not predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. But a closer look at CIA performance reveals that, while the Agency did not know everything about the Soviets, it did know a lot and had for the most part accurately analyzed the problems of communism and the strains under which it had labored.

BERLIN WALL

Removed from the Berlin Wall in November 1989, these three sections of reinforced concrete form a monument, dedicated at CIA Headquarters in 1992. Oriented just as the wall was in Berlin, the monument bears painted graffiti on its west side—in stark contrast to its whitewashed east side.





The First Gulf War

It was all such fun during the Cold War. But now, I wonder, what the hell is the point of it all?

— BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AFTER THE BERLIN WALL CAME DOWN

For the CIA, whose raison d'être for many years was to fight communism, the question above made sense. Some at CIA talked of paying a kind of peace dividend by, for example, letting some of its Russian speakers go. But soon the Agency's plate started filling up again. The world was still a dangerous place, perhaps even more dangerous, now that the threats were harder to categorize. CIA certainly did not lack for crises and issues to scrutinize. In 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait, compelling the United States to put together a coalition to eject his forces from the oil-rich sheikdom. In 1993, the attack by Islamic fundamentalists on the World Trade Center was the first in a series of such attacks that would continue into the next decade. Troubling outbreaks of terrorism began in Europe, and, for much of the 1990s, the successor states of the former Republic of Yugoslavia were at war. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to harrowing questions about the whereabouts of its nuclear arsenal; CIA found itself devoting more time to counterproliferation than ever before.

DESERT STORM LEAFLETS

The Agency produced leaflets like these to be dropped over locations in Iraq, subject to US military air strikes during Operation DESERT STORM. The leaflet translates as "Your equipment is subject to bombardment! Warning! This site will be bombed soon. Leave your equipment and save yourselves."



6

9/11 and After

“Every day is 9/12.”

— UNOFFICIAL MOTTO IN THE CIA COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

CIA's Team ALPHA rode on horseback with the Afghan Northern Alliance forces in an expedition that took the city of Mazar-e Sharif from the Taliban on 9 November 2001. CIA officers, like Team ALPHA's leader (pictured here), sometimes spent 10 hours or more a day in uncomfortable, wood-framed, Uzbek saddles from Afghanistan.

9/11

Sixty years earlier, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor led to the creation of the OSS. Similarly, the surprise attacks by the Islamic terrorist group known as al-Qa'ida on 11 September 2001 brought about profound changes in the American Intelligence Community. In general terms, the intent of the changes was to prevent another such attack from occurring. CIA had established the Counterterrorism Center in 1986, but its work did not become an all-consuming priority for the Agency as a whole until 2001. CIA now had a focus to replace the Soviet threat. The attacks also led to a reorganization of the Intelligence Community, with legislation creating a senior coordinating organization—the Director of National Intelligence—to replace the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence at CIA, created by the National Security Act of 1947. Under the new legislation, CIA became primarily responsible for operations to collect human intelligence and produce all-source intelligence analysis.

WORLD TRADE CENTER SAFE DRAWER

This safe drawer came from the rubble of one of the World Trade Center buildings. Luckily, the occupants escaped safely before the building collapsed late in the afternoon on 11 September 2001. An eyewitness described the recovery of the drawer:

When you think about breaking a steel safe...the force that crushed those buildings' floors just must have been incredible...the drawer part was melted to the body part of the safe. The temperature had been so hot [inside the building that] it literally melted the safe into one piece...they estimated that the temperature was something like 1,600° to 1,800° or 1,900°...They found a little bit of paper, some identification badges, some hard drives, a few components of electronic equipment, some twisted pieces of safe, but they didn't find very much....Not when you considered how much was there.



First on the Ground

Although its leadership was not Afghan, al-Qa'ida had established a home base in Afghanistan, which was ruled by Muslim fundamentalists known as the Taliban. In the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush decided to destroy that base and bring down the regime that had offered al-Qa'ida hospitality. He ordered CIA to be the first on the ground to lay the foundation for the campaign to follow. Fifteen days after 9/11, a handful of CIA paramilitary officers landed in Afghanistan and reestablished relationships with local fighters who had received CIA aid in fighting Soviet occupiers during the 1980s. Operating in concert with those fighters, CIA and American special operations forces then took the fight to al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. Allied nations joined in the fight, and, with overwhelming US air support, the new coalition was able to kill or capture a significant number of al-Qa'ida fighters and overthrow the Taliban regime by December 2001. However, al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin Ladin escaped, fleeing to Pakistan.

MINE PROBING TOOL

A CIA explosives ordinance team carried this tool when they uncovered an improvised explosive device (IED) made up of dozens of mines and artillery shells—2,400 pounds in all—in the dirt-covered roof of the governor's palace at Kandahar in December 2001. The team disarmed the IED before it could be detonated.

MI-17 COCKPIT INSTRUMENT

In Operation JAWBREAKER, CIA put the first Americans on the ground in Afghanistan, just 15 days after the 9/11 attacks. The seven-man team landed behind enemy lines in an Agency-owned Mi-17, the rugged Soviet-designed helicopter of choice in many parts of the world. The crew later changed the helicopter's tail number to 91101 as a tribute to the victims of 9/11. This instrument came from that helicopter.





POINTY-TALKY LANGUAGE CHART

The tribes of northern Afghanistan commonly speak the Dari language. Americans not fluent in Dari could use this chart to communicate basic words and phrases in written and spoken phonetic Dari.

SADDLE USED IN AFGHAINSTAN

Joint CIA-Special Forces-Afghan teams had to use local transportation—including horses—for some travel. Cavalry was also used operationally against the Taliban. A CIA communications officer obtained this saddle for the CIA Museum with the assistance of an Afghan colleague who was killed a month later.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LASER ACQUISITION MARKER (SOFLAM)

US forces in Afghanistan used the AN/PEQ-1A SOFLAM to mark targets with laser light for the precise delivery of laser-guided ordnance. The SOFLAM was critical in the battle for Tora Bora where a joint CIA-Special Forces team directed 72 hours of unrelenting air strikes—sometimes perilously close to its own position.

RAW LAPIS LAZULI ORE

Al-Qa'ida uses lapis lazuli, a semi-precious royal-blue gemstone, in its financial network to bypass the traceability of cash transactions within the world's standard monetary system. This trunk of raw ore—possibly used as currency to pay fighters—came from a captured Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan.







JAWBREAKER KNIFE

CIA officer Gary Schroen was starting his transition to retirement, but after 9/11 he volunteered to return to active service and lead Operation JAWBREAKER into Afghanistan. He carried this knife with him in the war zone.

LIFESAVER

A CIA medic carried this multipurpose Schrade tool in Afghanistan. He used it to perform numerous surgical procedures on Afghan partners, including three lower-leg amputations.

The 2003 Iraq War

CIA was intimately involved in US Government operations in Iraq. After 9/11, the Bush Administration was concerned about possible support to terrorism by Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn, whose regime had used weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Iran in the 1980s. In 2002-2003, CIA participated in the intense discussions about the continued existence of any such weapons. CIA did much to support the military operations that followed to overthrow Saddam. A US-led coalition seized Baghdad in April 2003, and in the ensuing occupation, CIA established a presence in the country to monitor years of difficult—and often dangerous—political developments.



THURAYA SATELLITE PHONE

Intelligence officers relied heavily on Thuraya phones in 2003 to communicate on the ground during the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom after most other communication lines were destroyed or interrupted during the invasion.

The War on Terrorism, Continued

The terrorist threat continued while American forces operated in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, a delicate balance existed between the US presence and terrorist activity. Counterterrorist operations brought terrorist responses, but as time went on, a number of terrorist leaders were killed or captured, to include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in Iraq, and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, captured and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay since 2006.

The highest priority target, Usama Bin Ladin, remained elusive until intelligence analysts and targeters located him in Pakistan and a special operations team killed him in May 2011. Most of these counterterrorist operations were joint in the sense that CIA, the US military, and other parts of the Intelligence Community worked together more closely than they ever had in the past.

ABBOTTABAD COMPOUND MODEL

In support of the raid that resulted in the death of Usama Bin Ladin, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) model makers built this exact copy of the Abbottabad Compound 1 Model. The NGA Director presented it to the CIA's Associate Deputy Director on 22 January 2013.





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
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